On November 19, 2026, the U.S. Department of Labor announced its final rule on independent contractor classification under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The rule rescinds the Biden-era rule that took effect in March 2024 and replaces it with an analysis that, in the agency’s words, is “substantially similar” to the streamlined framework the DOL adopted in the waning days of the first Trump administration in January 2021.  The new rule will take effect 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register.

For those keeping score, this is the latest turn on what has been a very bumpy road.  In January 2021, the DOL issued a rule built around two “core factors”—control and opportunity for profit or loss.  The Biden DOL delayed and then withdrew that rule before it took effect, only to have a federal court in Texas hold in March 2022 that the withdrawal was unlawful and that the 2021 rule had been in effect all along.  The DOL then proposed (as we discussed here) and finalized (as we discussed here) a new rule, effective March 11, 2024, that returned to a six-factor “totality of the circumstances” analysis.  Five lawsuits challenged the 2024 rule; according to the DOL, four remain pending but have been stayed.  On May 1, 2025, the DOL announced in Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2025-1 that it would no longer apply the 2024 rule in its enforcement actions, and on February 27, 2026, it proposed bringing back the 2021 framework.  Some 16,500 comments later, the final rule does just that, with a few modifications and enhancements.

The New Rule

The final rule replaces 29 C.F.R. Part 795 in its entirety.  As in both the 2021 and 2024 rules, the “ultimate inquiry” is economic dependence—i.e., whether, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is economically dependent on the potential employer for work (an employee) or is in business for themself (an independent contractor).  The new rule adds a gloss on that concept, explaining that “[t]hough both employees and independent contractors are dependent on others in some sense, economic dependence in this context means the dependence that a typical employee has on an employer for work, as opposed to an individual who has more of the nature and character of a business owner who has a separate business.”  Borrowing from the 2024 rule, it also notes that economic dependence “does not focus on the amount of income the worker earns, or whether the worker has other sources of income.”

The rule identifies five non-exhaustive factors.  The first two are “core” factors:

  • Nature and degree of control over the work.  This factor weighs in favor of independent contractor status to the extent the individual “exercises substantial control over key aspects of the performance of the work, such as by setting his or her own schedule, by selecting his or her projects, or through the ability to work for others, which might include the potential employer’s competitors.”  It weighs in favor of employee status to the extent the potential employer controls the individual’s schedule or workload, or “directly or indirectly requir[es] the individual to work exclusively for the potential employer.”  As in 2021, “[r]equiring the individual to comply with specific legal obligations, satisfy health and safety standards, carry insurance, meet contractually agreed-upon deadlines or quality control standards, or satisfy other similar terms that are typical of contractual relationships between businesses (as opposed to employment relationships)” is not indicative of control.  New to the final rule, however, is a caution that “[t]he nature of a particular requirement turns on its substance and practical operation, not the characterization of its purpose,” such that “detailed instructions governing how, when, or where the worker must perform the work may indicate control typical of an employment relationship even if described as promoting health or safety or maintaining quality control standards.”
  • Opportunity for profit or loss.  This factor weighs in favor of independent contractor status to the extent the individual can earn profits or incur losses based on their “exercise of initiative (such as managerial skill or business acumen or judgment)” or “management of his or her investment in or capital expenditure on, for example, helpers or equipment or material to further his or her work, or both.”  The individual need not have both, but “evidence under one consideration pointing to either independent contractor or employee status could be outweighed by more persuasive evidence under the other.”  The factor points toward employee status where the individual “is unable to affect his or her earnings or is only able to do so by working more hours or faster.”  The 2024 rule’s standalone “investments” factor is folded into this one.

The remaining three factors are:

  • Amount of skill required.  This factor favors independent contractor status where the work “requires specialized training or skill that the potential employer does not provide,” and favors employee status where the work requires no specialized training or skill or the individual depends on the potential employer for the training needed to do the job.
  • Degree of permanence.  This factor favors independent contractor status where the relationship is “by design definite in duration or sporadic,” and employee status where it is “by design indefinite in duration or continuous.”  The seasonal nature of work, by itself, does not necessarily indicate independent contractor status.  Exclusivity, which the 2024 rule considered under this factor, is now addressed only under the control factor.
  • Whether the work is part of an integrated unit of production.  This factor favors independent contractor status where the individual’s work is “segregable from the potential employer’s production process,” and employee status where it is “a component of the potential employer’s integrated production process for a good or service.”  The rule specifies that this factor “is different from the concept of the importance or centrality of the individual’s work to the potential employer’s business.”

Additional factors may be considered, “but only if the factors in some way indicate whether the individual is in business for him- or herself.”

As for weighting, the two core factors “typically carr[y] greater weight in the analysis than any other factor,” and if both point toward the same classification, “there is a substantial likelihood that is the individual’s accurate classification,” because the remaining factors are “highly unlikely, either individually or collectively, to outweigh the combined probative value of the two core factors.”  Notably, the DOL declined to adopt an alternative floated in the proposed rule under which a finding that the control factor indicated employee status could end the inquiry.  The agency acknowledged that the alternative had “engendered significant confusion” and declined to adopt “an analysis that considers control as the potentially only factor.”

Rounding out the rule are a provision (§ 795.110) stating that “the actual practice of the parties involved is more relevant than what may be contractually or theoretically possible,” and fourteen illustrative examples (§ 795.115)—eight more than in the 2021 rule—covering, among others, app-based delivery workers, farm labor contractors, lease-purchase truck drivers, roofers, and digital media editors and freelance journalists.  The rule also amends the DOL’s Family and Medical Leave Act and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act regulations so that the same analysis applies under those statutes, both of which incorporate the FLSA’s definition of “employ.”

Some Observations

Take That (Again).  When the DOL proposed the 2024 rule, we noted that it included language clearly responsive to arguments raised by employers in misclassification cases.  The new rule reads in places like a point-by-point response to the 2024 rule.  For example:

  • The 2024 rule treated the use of “technological means of supervision” as evidence of control.  In one of the new examples, by contrast, a delivery platform’s location monitoring, dynamic pricing, and deactivation of accounts with excessive cancellations “are not indicative of an employment relationship,” and “[u]sing technology to facilitate business operations does not indicate control over the individual.”
  • The 2024 rule (in a retreat from the proposed rule) provided that only actions taken “for the sole purpose of complying with a specific, applicable” law are not indicative of control, while actions serving the employer’s own safety, quality control, or contractual standards may be.  The new rule takes a broader view of compliance-related requirements, subject to the new clarifying language discussed above.
  • The 2024 rule considered the worker’s investments “on a relative basis” with the potential employer’s.  The new rule disregards the potential employer’s investments entirely; in one example, the fact that a home-repair app company “invested millions of dollars” in its platform is “not relevant.”
  • As we observed in 2022, the 2024 rule’s focus on whether the function a worker performs is “critical, necessary, or central” to the business “hone[d] closer to the second prong of the ABC test than earlier iterations of the federal standard.”  The new rule’s “integrated unit” factor expressly rejects that approach.

Will It Matter?  Loper Bright and the Courts

As the DOL acknowledges, “[c]ourts have always been the final word on the meaning and application of the law,” and the regulation does “not bind or control the courts—only Department investigators.”  The question, then, is how much weight courts will give it.

In our posts on the 2022 proposed rule and 2024 final rule, we noted that if the courts treated Part 795 like other “interpretive” rules, the weight they afford it should depend on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade”—the standard set out in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.  That remains the case, and the Supreme Court’s June 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo reinforces it.

In Loper Bright, the Court overruled Chevron and held that “[c]ourts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.”  At the same time, the Court made clear that courts “may—as they have from the start—seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes,” citing Skidmore.  A few observations on what that means for the new rule:

Not Much Has Changed on Paper.  Part 795 has always been an interpretive rule—the agency describes it as its “general interpretations”—and interpretive rules have long been evaluated under Skidmore.  Loper Bright confirms that framework, and a rule that is thorough, well-reasoned, and grounded in Supreme Court and circuit precedent is well positioned under it.

The DOL Wrote This Rule for Loper Bright.  You can see Loper Bright all over this final rule.  The preamble anchors the analysis in the Supreme Court’s foundational economic reality cases (Rutherford Food, Silk, and Bartels), catalogs the circuit decisions it distills, responds at length to the comments, and expresses the agency’s view that the rule will not produce different outcomes than the courts have reached.  The DOL also cites Loper Bright directly for the proposition that notice-and-comment rulemaking “should enhance the persuasive power of this rule in the eyes of federal judges.”

Circuit Precedent Still Controls.  Most federal circuits already have their own formulation of the economic reality test.  In the Second Circuit, for example, courts apply the five factors from Brock v. Superior Care, Inc. under a totality of the circumstances analysis.  The DOL’s position is that the rule distills, rather than departs from, existing case law, and that the core factors reflect the weight courts have long given control and opportunity for profit or loss in practice.  Where the rule is most likely to matter is in the close cases, where the factors point in different directions and circuit law leaves room on how to weigh them.  In those cases, a clear, well-reasoned framework from the agency charged with enforcing the statute may well be persuasive.

The Portal-to-Portal Act Defense Is the Real Prize.  Whatever weight courts give the rule, § 795.100 expressly invokes Section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 259, which gives employers a complete defense to FLSA minimum wage and overtime liability for acts taken in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on “any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation” of the Wage and Hour Administrator.  The defense is available even if the interpretation is later “modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect.”  That defense is statutory; it doesn’t depend on deference, and Loper Bright doesn’t touch it.  Given the regulatory back-and-forth we have seen, that certainty is significant.  Employers that wish to rely on the defense should make, and document, classification decisions with the rule in hand.  And the defense is not available under the FMLA, the MSPA, or state law.

More Litigation Is Coming.  We expect challenges to the new rule, both in principle and in the context of particular fact patterns.

Don’t Forget the States

As we have said before, the new rule does nothing to change the analysis under state laws that apply a more stringent or otherwise different test for worker classification, including (among others) the ABC tests in California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.  The DOL itself acknowledges that the rule does not preempt those laws and that employers must meet “whichever standard provides workers with the greatest protection.”  The rule also has no effect on worker status under the Internal Revenue Code or the National Labor Relations Act.  If a worker is deemed an employee under state law—which may have statutes of limitations and remedies that equal or exceed those available under the FLSA—then federal law will not limit the potential exposure.

Proskauer’s Wage and Hour Group is comprised of seasoned litigators who regularly advise the world’s leading companies to help them avoid, minimize, and manage exposure to wage and hour-related risk.  Subscribe to our wage and hour blog to stay current on the latest developments.

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Photo of Allan Bloom Allan Bloom

Allan Bloom is the co-chair of Proskauer’s Labor & Employment Law Department and a nationally recognized litigator and advisor who represents employers, business owners, and management in a broad range of employment and labor law matters. As a litigator, Allan has successfully defended…

Allan Bloom is the co-chair of Proskauer’s Labor & Employment Law Department and a nationally recognized litigator and advisor who represents employers, business owners, and management in a broad range of employment and labor law matters. As a litigator, Allan has successfully defended many of the world’s leading companies against claims for unpaid wages, employment discrimination, breach of contract and wrongful discharge, both at the trial and appellate court levels as well as in arbitration, before government agencies, and in private negotiations. He has secured complete defense verdicts for clients in front of juries, as well as injunctions to protect clients’ confidential information and assets.

As the leader of Proskauer’s Wage and Hour Practice Group, Allan has been a strategic partner to a number of Fortune 500 companies to help them avoid, minimize and manage exposure to wage and hour-related risk. Allan’s views on wage and hour issues have been featured in The New York Times, Reuters, Bloomberg and Fortune, among other leading publications. His class-action defense work for clients has saved billions of dollars in potential damages.

Allan is regularly called on to advise operating companies, management companies, fund sponsors, boards of directors and senior leadership on highly sensitive matters including executive and key person transitions, internal investigations and strategic workforce planning. He has particular expertise in the financial services industry, where he has litigated, arbitrated, and mediated disputes for more than 20 years.

A prolific author and speaker, Allan was the Editor of the New York State Bar Association’s Labor and Employment Law Journal from 2012 to 2017. He has served as an author, editor and contributor to a number of leading treatises in the field of employment law, including ADR in Employment Law (ABA/Bloomberg BNA), Employment Discrimination Law (ABA/Bloomberg BNA), Cutting Edge Advances in Resolving Workplace Disputes (Cornell University/CPR), The Employment Law Review (Law Business Research, U.S. Chapter Author), and The Complete Compliance and Ethics Manual (SCCE).

Allan has served as longtime pro bono counsel to Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts and The Public Theater, among other nonprofit organizations.  He is a past Vice Chair of Repair the World, a nonprofit organization that mobilizes volunteers and their communities to take action to pursue a just world, and a past recipient of the Lawyers Alliance Cornerstone Award for extraordinary contributions through pro bono legal services.

Allan is a Fellow of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers and has been recognized as a leading practitioner by Chambers since 2011.